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INTRODUCTION
When a defendant fails to object to an issue at sentencing, he may
lose the right to make that challenge again later—but only if the court
determines that he acted intentionally. 1 If a defendant disagrees with
his lawyer’s decision not to object, should the lawyer’s failure to
object constitute an intentional choice by the defendant? 2 Principles of
waiver should be construed in favor of the defendant and the court has
the discretion to infer a defendant’s intent based on the record. 3 If
there are ambiguities in the record, the court should resolve them in
the light most favorable to the defendant, particularly when issues of
sentencing are concerned. 4
 J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Sociology, Northwestern University, 2010.
1 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Murry, 395 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2005)).
2 See United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 973 (7th Cir. 2018).
3 United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001)).
4 United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001)).
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Wayne Scott was on conditional release after serving a term of
imprisonment for fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 5 Scott violated the
conditions of his release, and on January 17, 2017, the district court
held a revocation hearing to address his latest violation – opening a
new line of credit without consulting his probation officer. 6 After the
court determined that Scott did violate the terms of his release, the
government recommended five months in custody and an additional
thirty-six months of supervised release based on a sentencing
recommendation prepared for a previous probation violation. 7 The
court declined to place Scott into custody because of his compliance
with his restitution payments. 8 Defense counsel stated, “we have no
objection to extending the period of mandatory supervised release.”9
The court then advised Scott to follow the terms of his conditional
release to avoid future court involvement and Scott began to speak. 10
Scott stated, “Your Honor, I just want to add for the record,” before his
defense attorney interrupted, advising Scott to speak with him first. 11
After speaking to Scott, defense counsel advised the judge that Scott
had nothing to say and the hearing ended. 12
Scott retained new counsel for his next status hearing when the
court discovered it had to impose a period of custody to extend Scott’s
supervised release period. 13 The new attorney requested a shorter
period of supervised release but made no mention about the lack of
sentencing guidelines calculation or the fact that Scott was not
permitted to allocute at the revocation hearing. 14 Scott later filed a
motion to reconsider challenging the district court’s supervised release
5

Scott, 900 F.3d at 973.
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 974.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
6
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violation finding, advocating for a shorter sentence of supervised
release, and stating that he disagreed with his attorney’s decision to not
object to the sentence of supervised release. 15 The district court denied
the motion and Scott timely appealed. 16 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling, finding that Scott waived both his challenge
to the lack of sentencing guidelines calculation and his right to
allocution.17
The first part of this comment will discuss the principle of waiver
and how its standard differs from that of forfeiture. The second section
will summarize the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Scott.
The third section will analyze the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Scott
against precedent in the circuit and argue that the case should have
been remanded to the district court for a new calculation under the
sentencing guidelines.
BACKGROUND
When a defendant intentionally and voluntarily gives up a claim
to a known right, it constitutes a waiver of that right, precludes
appellate review, and extinguishes error. 18 “Waiver principles should
be construed liberally in favor of the defendant.” 19 When a defendant
does not make an objection at his sentencing hearing that may
communicate that he does not wish to argue the sentence imposed. 20
When a defendant decides not to make an argument for tactical
reasons that constitutes an intentional decision - not mere oversight and he has waived his ability to make that argument later. 21 If a
15

Id.
Id.
17 Id.
18 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Murry, 395 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2005)).
19 United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001).
20 United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing JaimesJaimes, 406 F.3d at 848).
21 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848.
16
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defendant does not make an argument due to oversight or negligence,
however, that constitutes forfeiture and may be subject to plain error
review at the appellate level, if the defendant can demonstrate good
cause.22 “Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant
must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures
are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be
particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.” 23
When a legal rule was violated, there has been an error regardless of
whether the defendant timely objected. 24
The Seventh Circuit found that a defendant waived his rights at
sentencing when he made arguments against certain findings in his
presentence report and then stated that he had no further objections. 25
Similarly, when a defense attorney stated he had reviewed the
presentence report with his client and they had no objections to the
guidelines calculation, the court of appeals found that the defendant
knew of his right to object and intentionally decided not to do so. 26
The major difference between waiver and forfeiture is that
forfeiture does not extinguish error on appeal and instead permits
review for plain error.27 However, the line between waiver and
forfeiture is not always clear, and courts sometimes find it difficult to
distinguish the two. 28 Waiver is an intentional decision to not assert a
right while forfeiture is an accidental or negligent “failure to make the
timely assertion of a right.” 29 To determine whether a right was waived
or forfeited, the court must examine the defendant’s mental state at the
22

United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (citing 2 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, 3 CRIM. PROC. § 11.6 (4th ed.1984); George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal
Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977)).
24 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34.
25 Brodie, 507 F.3d at 531.
26 United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2000).
27 United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Olano, 507
U.S. at 731).
28 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541
(7th Cir. 2009)).
29 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.
23
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time he could have made the objection. 30 When deciding whether a
right was waived, the court analyzes each omission to determine
whether it was a strategic decision to not object. 31 It is the
government’s burden to show a strategic justification for a defendant’s
failure to object to prove waiver. 32 Generally, when a defendant does
not object to an issue at his sentencing hearing, the court finds that the
defendant waived the issue; however, there is no rigid “rule that every
objection not raised at a sentencing hearing is waived.”33 To determine
a defendant’s intent in not arguing a point, the court makes inferences
from the record as a whole and considers the particular
circumstances.34 “[A]n argument should be deemed forfeited rather
than waived if finding waiver from an ambiguous record would
compel the conclusion that counsel necessarily would have been
deficient to advise the defendant not to object.” 35 The Seventh Circuit
found that the failure to object by defendant and his counsel at
sentencing was merely forfeiture and not waiver when the defendant
had made an objection to the restitution calculation prior to
sentencing, even though both the defendant and his counsel stated at
sentencing that they had no objections. 36
When a court finds that a defendant forfeited a right, then the
“remarkably demanding” plain error tests applies. 37 A defendant bears
the burden to show: “(1) an error or defect that (2) is clear or obvious

30

Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997,
1001 (7th Cir. 2010)).
31 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing Anderson, 604 F.3d at 1002).
32 Anderson, 604 F.3d at 1001-02.
33 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (quoting United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d
845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).
34 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542
(7th Cir. 2009)).
35 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Richardson, 238
F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001)).
36 United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008).
37 Butler, 777 F.3d at 388 (citing Anderson, 604 F.3d at 1002).
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and (3) affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”38 If a defendant
meets this burden, the court has the discretion to correct the error – it
is not required to do so. 39 The court may correct the error when it
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”40 The standard of plain error review “is
permissive, not mandatory.”41 The Supreme Court has determined it
should be exercised “in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of
justice would otherwise result.” 42 While “miscarriage of justice”
applies to cases where the defendant is actually innocent, the doctrine
is generally applied more broadly. 43
Judges are required to calculate the guidelines range before
sentencing a defendant to a term of supervised release.44 While judges
are not required to sentence a defendant to a term within the range, the
federal code requires them to consider the enumerated subsections in
section 3553(a) when deciding the length of a sentence of
imprisonment and conditions of supervised release. 45 The record must
indicate that the district court actually considered the guidelines
range.46 Failure to do so constitutes reversible error. 47
When a defendant argued that his criminal history score was
improperly calculated and the calculation he advocated for led to a
sentencing guidelines range that overlapped with the range calculated
38

Butler, 777 F.3d at 388 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736
(1993)).
39 Id.
40 United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Kibler, 279 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2002)).
41 Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
42 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)).
43 Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
44 United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1181 (7th Cir. 2015).
45 United States v. Griffin, 806 F.3d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c),
3583(c))).
46 United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 2017).
47 Downs, 784 F.3d at 1181.
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by the district court, the Seventh Circuit found that was insufficient to
constitute plain error because the defendant failed to show a
substantial right was affected. 48 However, when the district court
failed to calculate the appropriate sentencing guidelines range before
imposing a period of supervised release, the Seventh Circuit found that
was not a harmless error because judges are required to consider the
guidelines range before imposing any sentence – even though they are
not required to actually impose a sentence within that resulting
range.49
UNITED STATES V. SCOTT
Wayne Scott was on conditional release after completing a prison
term for defrauding investors and potential investors. 50 As part of his
supervised release, Scott was not permitted to open new lines of credit
without the approval of his probation officer. 51 The government filed a
motion alleging that Scott violated that provision of his release on
January 17, 2017 and on July 6, 2017, the district court held a
revocation hearing.52 The district court determined that Scott violated
the terms of his release and, based off of a report created for a
previous violation, the government recommended five months in
custody and an additional thirty-six months of supervised release. 53
Because Scott had been complying with his restitution payments, the
court denied imposing a period of custody. 54 The government renewed
its request for an extended period of supervised release, and defense
counsel advised that he had no objection. 55 The court imposed the
thirty-six months of supervised release and then addressed Scott to
48

United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2015).
Downs, 784 F.3d at 1181.
50 United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 973 (7th Cir. 2018).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 974.
49
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remind him to continue making restitution payments to avoid future
court appearances. 56 Scott began to address the court, saying, “Your
Honor, I just want to add for the record,” before his defense attorney
interrupted, saying “No, you’re going to talk to me first.”57 After
speaking to Scott, defense counsel stated, “Pardon me, Judge. Thank
you for the opportunity to talk. I don’t believe he has anything else he
wants to tell the Court,” and the hearing ended. 58
Scott was represented by a different attorney at his next status
hearing when the court determined that the extension of Scott’s
supervised release required a period of custody. 59 The court ordered a
one day sentence with time considered served followed by the thirtysix months of supervised release and then asked whether there was any
objection.60 Scott’s new counsel stated he was, “not looking to reopen
Mr. Scott’s sentencing hearing,” but advocated for a shorter period of
supervised release. 61 Counsel did not argue that the sentencing
guidelines calculation was not performed or that Scott had no
opportunity to allocute62 at the revocation hearing. 63
After the status hearing, Scott filed a motion to reconsider, on the
grounds that: he did not agree with his attorney’s decision to not object
to the additional time of supervised release, no sentencing guidelines
calculation was performed at the hearing, the penalties were not
explained to him, and he was not permitted to present mitigating
56

Id.
Id.
58 Id. at 974.
59
Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Allocution is a defendant’s opportunity to address the court at sentencing.
The three major theories in support of allocution posit that it allows the defendant
the opportunity to accept responsibility for his actions, mitigate his sentence, and
humanize himself to the court. Mark W. Bennett and Ira P. Robbins, Last Words: A
Survey and Analysis of Federal Judges’ Views of Allocution in Sentencing, 65 ALA.
L. REV. 735, 739 (2013) (citing Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards
a Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2655-67 (2007)).
63 Scott, 900 F.3d at 974.
57
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factors at the hearing. 64 The district court denied Scott’s motion and he
filed a timely appeal. 65
The Seventh Circuit found that Scott waived his right to challenge
both the thirty-six months of supervised release imposed and that the
district court did not allow him to allocute. 66 The court noted that
revocation hearings do not provide the same constitutional rights to a
defendant that a sentencing hearing does. 67 However, the dissent
addresses this somewhat cryptic statement by pointing out that in a
revocation hearing, the district court is still required to consider the
appropriate sentencing guidelines range by at least referencing a report
prepared by the probation office advising what the guidelines range
is.68 The court then cited to the fact that Scott’s counsel had no
objection to the additional thirty-six months of supervised release and
that while Scott began to speak to the judge, after conferring with his
counsel, his attorney advised the court Scott had nothing to say. 69 The
majority opined that it did not want to interfere with the attorney-client
relationship.70
However, the dissent characterized the revocation hearing and the
interaction between Scott and his attorney differently.71 Chief Judge
Wood noted first that the district court did not properly calculate a
guidelines sentence and instead relied on a report prepared for Scott’s
previous probation violation.72 Then, Scott’s counsel spoke for him,
stating that they did not have any objection to the imposition of an
additional thirty-six months of supervised release. 73 Next, defense
counsel interrupted Scott when he attempted to assert his right to
64

Id.
Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2015)).
68 Scott, 900 F.3d at 979 (Wood, J., dissenting).
69 Scott, 900 F.3d at 974.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 975 (Wood, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 976 (Wood, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
65
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allocute.74 Finally, defense counsel spoke for Scott, advising the court
that Scott had nothing to say. 75 Scott retained a new lawyer and
attempted to address the lack of sentencing guidelines calculation and
allocution, but the district court ruled that it was too late. 76 The dissent
performed a thorough analysis of the record, and went line-by- line to
determine what occurred at the sentencing hearing between the
government, the court, and the defense. 77 The dissent noted that
Scott’s attorney agreed to extend the period of mandatory supervised
release before the government or court made a recommendation of
how many months to extend the supervised release. 78 “The
government recommended a 36-month term only after Scott’s counsel
had agreed to some extension.”79 The dissent then summarized the end
of the hearing as follows: Scott attempted to address to court, he was
interrupted by his attorney, then conferred with his attorney, Scott’s
attorney then addressed the court to advise the judge that Scott had
nothing further to say, and the judge did not confirm with Scott instead
just said, “All right. That’s fine.”80 The dissent concluded, based on its
reading of the record, that Scott did not waive his arguments regarding
his right to a sentencing guidelines calculation and allocution and
would have remanded to the district court for a new revocation hearing
where the district court would actually calculate the sentencing
guidelines for Scott’s violation.81

74

Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
76 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
77 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
81 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting).
75
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ANALYSIS
Neither Scott nor his counsel objected at his revocation hearing to
the imposition of thirty-six months of supervised release.82 A failure to
object may communicate his intention to relinquish an argument, but it
does not automatically constitute a waiver. 83 The court should also
consider whether there was a strategic reason to not object to a
provision at sentencing and whether it was deficient for defense
counsel to not object. 84 The Scott majority did not consider whether
there was any strategic reason to not object to the period of supervised
release suggested by the government. 85 Scott retained a new attorney
after his revocation hearing, and while it is not in the record, the court
could have inferred it was because Scott was unhappy with his
previous counsel’s performance at sentencing.86 As the record stands,
it is at the very least ambiguous as to whether Scott’s previous counsel
was acting strategically or negligently. 87 Principles of waiver are
meant to be construed in the defendant’s favor. 88 When a court
determines whether a defendant intentionally made the choice to not
object, it relies on inferences from the record and the circumstances
particular to the defendant. 89
The facts in Scott are similar to those in United States v. JaimesJaimes, where the Seventh Circuit found that counsel’s failure to
object to a sentence enhancement constituted forfeiture – not waiver.90
82

United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United
States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005)).
84 Allen, 529 F.3d at 395 (citing United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531-32
(7th Cir. 2007); Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848).
85 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974.
86 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974.
87 See id.
88 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d
532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001)).
89 United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th Cir. 2009)).
90 See Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848.
83
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Scott’s counsel did not allow him to address the court and Scott later
stated that he disagreed with his lawyer’s decision to not challenge the
sentencing guidelines calculation.91 In Jaimes-Jaimes, the Seventh
Circuit found that while the statement from defense counsel that his
client did not have an objection to the content of the presentence report
was significant, it did not automatically constitute a waiver of the right
of the defendant to later appeal any guidelines calculation in the
report.92 Despite the court ruling under similar circumstances that a
defendant had waived his right to appeal the guidelines sentence in his
presentence report, the court ruled that it was not “an inflexible rule
that every objection not raised at a sentencing hearing is waived.” 93
When the Seventh Circuit could not think of any strategic reason for a
defendant to choose not to object to multiple level increases in his
offense level and the government also offered no reasonable
justification, the court of appeals found that the most probable
explanation was that the defendant’s counsel made an oversight in not
challenging the increase. 94 That oversight by defense counsel was
accidental and not an intentional choice made by defendant and
therefore constituted forfeiture and was subject to plain error review.95
The Seventh Circuit in Scott was aware of its decision in JaimesJaimes, the majority opinion even cites the case while discussing the
concept of waiver. 96 However, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss the
facts of Jaimes-Jaimes or distinguish it from Scott.97 Rene JaimesJaimes (“Jaimes”) pleaded guilty to unlawfully remaining in the
United States after being deported. 98 The presentence report prepared
by probation and the written plea agreement prepared by the parties
91

See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974.
Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 849.
96 Scott, 900 F.3d at 973 (quoting Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (“The
touchstone of waiver is a knowing and intentional decision.”)).
97 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 973.
98 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 846.
92
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both calculated that Jaimes’ offense level should be increased by
sixteen points.99 The district court accepted the calculation and
sentenced Jaimes to seventy-eight months of imprisonment, which was
within the calculated guidelines range of seventy to seventy-eight
months.100 On appeal, Jaimes argued that his offense level was
improperly increased by sixteen and should have only been increased
by eight, and that miscalculation constituted plain error. 101 The
Seventh Circuit agreed, vacated, and remanded for resentencing. 102
The government argued that when defense counsel advised the court
that he had no objection to the guidelines calculation Jaimes waived
his right to challenge the calculation on appeal. 103 The court agreed
that in previous rulings it had found that defendants waived their right
to a sentencing guidelines argument under similar circumstances;
however, in those previous cases the court found the defendant was
acting strategically. 104 In Jaimes-Jaimes, the court found that the only
plausible explanation for defendant’s failure to object to the sentence
enhancement was oversight by his attorney. 105 Similarly, in Scott, no
strategic explanation is provided to explain why Scott’s counsel did
not object to the period of supervised release offered by the
government at sentencing. 106 The court had already advised the parties
that it would not impose a period of custody based on Scott’s
compliance with restitution payments.107 The dissent in Scott pointed
99

Id.
Id.
101 Id.
102
Id.
103 Id. at 847-48 (citing United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir.
2000) (finding that defendant had waived right to challenge guidelines calculation
when his attorney advised the court that he had reviewed the presentence report with
his client and they had no objection)).
104 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Martinez-Jimenez,
294 F.3d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th
Cir. 2001)).
105 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848.
106 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 973.
107 Id.
100
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out that the record showed that Scott’s attorney stated he had no
objection to a period of supervised release before the court even
advised how long that period might be. 108 If counsel did not even
know what sentence the court was going to impose, how could his
decision to not object to it reflect an intentional, strategic decision?
The “touchstone of waiver” is when a defendant makes objections
to certain conditions of supervised release and then intentionally
decides to not make objections to others.109 By purposefully choosing
to not object, the defendant has waived any challenges he may have
had to the provision. 110 Scott’s counsel did not make any objection to
either the failure of the court to perform a sentencing calculation or the
imposition of thirty-six months of supervised release.111 As remarked
above, Scott’s counsel blindly asserted there was no objection to a
period of supervised release before even learning what period of time
the court would impose. 112
When an attorney argued for a shorter sentence for his client
instead of making a direct challenge to the sentencing guidelines
calculation, the court found forfeiture of a right instead of waiver. 113 In
United States v. Butler, the defendant did not challenge the calculation
of his sentencing guidelines and the Seventh Circuit found that it was
due to oversight by defendant’s counsel rather than an intentional
decision and therefore constitute forfeiture and not waiver. 114 Upon
examining the record, the circuit court concluded that counsel objected
to the inclusion of a state forgery offense that increased the
defendant’s guidelines calculation by two points, but did not make the

108

Id. at 977 (Wood, J., dissenting).
United States v. Raney, 842 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting
United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2015)).
110 Raney, 842 F.3d 1044 (citing United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814
(7th Cir. 2016)).
111 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 973.
112 See id. at 977 (Wood, J., dissenting).
113 See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015).
114 Id.
109
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challenge to the guidelines calculation directly. 115 The government
could not articulate a strategic reason for defense counsel to not make
the challenge and therefore the Seventh Circuit found that the
defendant forfeited his right to challenge the guidelines calculation. 116
Similarly, Scott retained new counsel for his first status hearing after
sentencing who argued for a shorter period of supervised release
instead of making an outright challenge to the lack of sentencing
guidelines calculation. 117 The court in Scott did not consider whether
there was a strategic reason for Scott’s counsel to not make that
challenge. The court could have made an inference that the failure to
challenge the sentencing guidelines calculation was an oversight based
on the fact that Scott filed a motion to reconsider after that hearing
where he argued that he disagreed with his previous counsel’s decision
to not object and reasserted his new counsel’s arguments for a shorter
period of supervised release. 118 Instead, the court concluded that if
Scott wanted to challenge the lack of sentencing guidelines
calculation, the time to do so was at his first hearing after
sentencing.119
The court’s analysis in Butler did not stop at the conclusion of
forfeiture.120 The defendant still had to show the following under the
plain error test: “(1) an error or defect that (2) is clear or obvious and
(3) affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”121 The court found that
Butler did not meet the plain error standard when he argued that the
state forgery conviction should have been considered relevant conduct
under the sentencing guidelines.122 Butler argued that the actions
underlying the state forgery conviction were part of the same course of
conduct that he was being sentenced for and, therefore, should not
115

Id.
Id. at 388.
117 United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2018).
118 See id.
119 Id.
120 United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 2015).
121 Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).
122 Butler, 777 F.3d at 388.
116
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have increased his criminal history score by two points. 123 However,
the court found that the conduct was not related to the specific course
of conduct, and even if the two points had not been added to Butler’s
criminal history score, the corresponding guidelines range would have
been eighteen to twenty-four months.124 Because Butler was sentenced
to twenty-four months with the two point increase to his criminal
history score, he could not show that the district court would have
imposed a lower sentence and therefore Butler did not show that the
error affected his substantial rights. 125 In Scott, no sentencing
guidelines calculation was ever done for this particular supervised
release.126 For that reason, when considering whether the lack of
sentencing guidelines calculation constituted plain error, the facts in
Scott more closely resemble those in United States v. Allen, where the
district court failed to make a proper calculation of restitution owed. 127
When a defendant and his defense counsel independently told the
court they had no objections at sentencing, the Seventh Circuit still
found evidence in the record that indicated the defendant merely
forfeited his right to challenge the district court’s restitution
calculation.128 The court of appeals found that the defendant had
objected to the calculation before the sentencing and then determined
there was no strategic reason to forego that challenge at the hearing. 129
Therefore, the failure of defense counsel to object constituted
forfeiture and the defendant was entitled to plain error review.130 The
circuit court vacated the restitution and remanded the case to the
district court for a new calculation, finding that it was plain error when
the district court did not calculate the actual loss suffered by the
123

Id.
Id.
125 Id.
126 United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 980 (7th Cir. 2018) (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
127 See United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
124
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defendant’s victim.131 The Scott dissent notes that when revoking a
defendant’s supervised release, the district court must calculate and
consider the recommended guidelines range. 132 The government relied
on a 2015 report created by the probation office regarding an unrelated
violation of Scott’s supervised release when it suggested a period of
thirty-six months of supervised release for the 2017 violation. 133 The
Probation Office never prepared a report for the violation that was the
subject of the hearing in 2017; there was no sentencing guidelines
calculation done by the probation office or the district court for that
particular violation of supervised release. 134 “Judges are required to
calculate the applicable guidelines range before imposing sentence,
though not bound to sentence within that range.” 135 The district court
is the one responsible for calculating the guidelines sentence and the
Supreme Court has noted that a miscalculation of the guidelines leads
to a “risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty [that] particularly
undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”136 Before a judge can decide the length of a defendant’s
term of supervised release, he must calculate the guidelines range
according to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and use the resulting
range as an anchor in determining an appropriate sentence. 137 Because
the guidelines are so essential to sentencing, there is a presumption
that failing to even calculate the guidelines sentence would affect a
defendant’s sentence and therefore would constitute plain error by the
district court.138
131

Id.
United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 2018) (Wood, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1181 (7th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Snyder, 635 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2011)).
133 Scott, 900 F.3d at 980 (7th Cir. 2018) (Wood, J., dissenting).
134 Id.
135 United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 2015).
136 Scott, 900 F.3d at 980 (Wood, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosales-Mireles v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908 (2018)).
137 Downs, 784 F.3d at 1182.
138 Scott, 900 F.3d at 980 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing Downs, 784 F.3d at
1182).
132
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CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s precedent concerning principles of waiver
and forfeiture demonstrate that there is a presumption that a
defendant’s failure to object was not a waiver absent express, strategic
intent by the defendant and his defense counsel to do so. 139 Even in
circumstances where a defendant appears to have intentionally waived
a right, the court retains discretion to examine the record for evidence
that failure to object at sentencing was an oversight. 140 This follows
the Seventh Circuit’s declaration that “[w]aiver principles should be
construed liberally in favor of the defendant.” 141 In light of its
precedent, the court in Scott should have inferred from the record that
Scott’s former counsel did not strategically and intentionally decide
not to object to the imposition of thirty-six months of supervised
release. When Scott retained new counsel, his attorney advocated for a
shorter sentence at the first status hearing after sentencing; Scott filed
a motion to reconsider shortly after that hearing arguing that he did not
agree with his previous counsel’s decision to not object; and in that
same motion Scott addressed the issue that no sentencing guidelines
calculation was completed. 142 At one point, the dissent characterized
this case, after considering the record, as “not a good candidate for a
finding of forfeiture, much less waiver.” 143
The majority in Scott argued that if Scott wished to challenge the
lack of sentencing guidelines calculation and his inability to allocute,
he should have done so when he retained new counsel at the status
hearing.144 But, as the dissent points out, that is the language of

139

See United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id.
141 United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001)).
142 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974.
143 Id. at 979 (Wood, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 973.
140
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forfeiture.145 Clearly, the majority did not perceive any strategic
advantage by Scott’s lawyer to not objecting at that time; therefore, to
not do so was an oversight and would entitle Scott to plain error
review.146 While district court judges are no longer required to
sentence within the guidelines,147 they are required to calculate the
appropriate guidelines range and consider it when imposing a
sentence.148 To not even calculate a guidelines sentence before
imposing a period of supervised release was plain error that clearly
had a substantial effect on Scott’s rights. The Seventh Circuit should
have remanded to the district court to hold a new sentencing hearing,
calculate the guidelines range for the violation at issue, consider that
range prior to sentencing Scott, and then allow Scott the opportunity to
allocute.

145

Id. at 980 (Wood, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2007).
147 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
148 United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 2015).
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